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Case No. 20080413-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Jerry Cooper, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for four counts of knowingly filing a 
wrongful lien, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. May Defendant challenge Jury Instruction #34 on appeal where he 
expressly stated below that he had no objection to any of the proposed instructions? 
Standard of Review. When a defendant affirmatively represents to the trial 
court that he has no objection to the proceedings, any subsequent claim of error falls 
within the scope of the invited error doctrine, which precludes appellate review. See 
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, t 21,128 P.3d 1171 (declining to review Winfield's jury 
selection challenge where he affirmatively approved jury panel). 
2, Was the evidence sufficient to support Defend ant's jury conviction for four 
counts of filing a wrongful lien, and if not, was the insufficiency so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court plainly erred by submitting four counts to the jury? 
Standard of Review. 'To demonstrate that plain error occurred in the context of 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must show 'first that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime[s] charged and second 
that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury/" State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ^ 32, 55 P.3d 1131 
(brackets in original) (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 17,10 P.3d 346). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (West 2004): 
" Wrongful lien"' means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court 
of competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by 
the owner of the real property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-5(2) (West 2004): 
A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third 
degree felony if, at the time of recording or filing, the person 
knowingly had no present, lawful property interest in the real property 
and no reasonable basis to believe he had a present, lawful property 
interest in the real property. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with four counts of communications fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (West 2004), and four 
counts of filing a wrongful lien, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 38-9-1(6), 38-9-5(2) (West 2004). Rl-3.1 The trial court dismissed the 
communications fraud charges on the State's motion. R31. Following a two-day 
jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. R273. The trial court imposed the 
statutory prison term of zero to five years for each count, with two counts to be 
served consecutively and two counts to be served concurrently. R349-50. The trial 
court then suspended the prison terms and placed Defendant on a 36-month term of 
probation. R350. Defendant timely appealed. R392. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Upset with the result of a quiet title suit in which he was a named defendant, 
Defendant recorded a lien in the Utah County Recorder's Office against the real 
property of the husband and wife plaintiffs, their attorney, and the judge, asserting 
each was personally liable to him for $4,200,000 in damages. 
1
 The pleadings in Volume I are numbered sequentially, Rl-124, at which 
point the numbering restarts at Rl and continues through R203. There is no index 
for the first 124 pages of Volume I, where the information is found. 
3 
Richard and Mary Pace attended a Utah County tax sale in May 1997, where 
they purchased a 63% interest in a laundromat located in Provo, Utah. R462:61-62.2 
The Paces did not know who the owned the remaining 37% interest in the 
laundromat. Id. at 115. After making their purchase, the Paces drove by the 
laundromat, which was open for business. Id. at 62. But they did not enter, because 
there were ''signs posted that said that if [they] were not—if [they] were not friendly 
to the establishment that force and— [they] could be endangered by entering." Id. 
Given these warning signs, the Paces viewed themselves as unwelcome at the 
laundromat, and did not exercise their interest in the property at that time. Id. at 
114. The Paces paid the yearly property taxes on the laundromat, however, to 
maintain their 63% interest. Id. at 63. After investigating their options, the Paces 
hired a real estate attorney. Id. at 63; see also id. at 115. 
Attorney Rivers began representing the Paces in 2002-03. Id. at 139. He 
performed a title search to discover all the individuals who could possibly claim an 
interest in the laundromat. Id. at 139-40. There were so many different documents 
2
 Only the first of two transcript volumes covering Defendant's two-day jury 
trial held on 23-24 January 2008, is numbered in the record. See R462. However, the 
internal page numbers of the second volume continue from the first volume; 
accordingly, the State does not distinguish between the first and second transcript 
volumes in its citation to the record. 
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pertaining to the laundromat, however, that Rivers concluded there was no way he 
could determine the legal owner. Id. at 140. Accordingly, Rivers filed suit on behalf 
of the Paces to quiet title to the laundromat. Id. Defendant was one of the 
individuals listed on the title search and was thus named as a defendant in the 
Paces' civil suit. Id. at 140-41. 
The Paces' quiet title action was heard by Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
Davis in 2004. Id. at 245. Judge Davis recalled that there were approximately 12 
named defendants, including Defendant. Id. at 246. Judge Davis ruled in January 
2004 that the Paces had perfected their 63% interest in the laundromat. Id. at 247. 
Defendant did not object to Judge Davis's findings and conclusions, nor did he file 
an appeal. Id. 
Approximately eight months later, in September 2004, the Paces, attorney 
Rivers, and Judge Davis all began receiving numerous purported legal documents 
from Defendant. Id. at 64-65, 104-06, 143-44, 248-49; see also State's Exh. ## 1-7. 
Some of the documents were served, some were received by certified mail, and 
others were sent via regular mail. Id. at 65,143. The documents purported to give 
notice that unless Defendant's demands were met, Mary Pace, Richard Pace, 
attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis each owed Defendant $4,200,000 in damages. Id. 
at 75,106, 248-49; see also State's Exh. ## 1-4, 6-7. 
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Frightened and concerned, the Paces consulted attorney Rivers, who advised 
them that there was no need to respond to Defendant's documents because, among 
other things, they were not filed in any recognized court of law. Id. at 144. Judge 
Davis referred the documents he received from Defendant to the Administrative 
Office of the Courts (AOC). Id. at 248-251. 
In addition to these purported legal documents, Mary Pace, Richard Pace, 
attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis each received a document from Defendant entitled 
"Administrative Judgment." See R462 at 73-75, 105-06, 142-46, 182-83.3 That 
document was recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office on 15 November 
2004. State's Exh. #5 and Defendant's Exhibit #9 (capitalization omitted). 
Defendant's father recorded the Administrative Judgment document at Defendant's 
request. R462:283. Similar to the earlier-received documents, the Administrative 
Judgment document declared that Mary Pace, Richard Pace, attorney Rivers, and 
Judge Davis were each liable to Defendant for $4,200,000. See State's Exh. # 5 at 1, 
11, and Defendant's Exh. # 9 at 1,11. The Administrative Judgment was signed by 
both Defendant and Kenneth James Nielsen, who purported to be a "Private 
Administrative Hearing Officer." See R462:283; see also State's Exh. #5 at 14, and 
3
 State's Exh. # 5 differs from Defendant's Exh. #9 only in that Defendant's 
Exh. #9 includes copies of earlier-sent documents. See R462:249. A copy of State's 
Exh #5 is attached in Addendum A. 
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Defendant's Exh. #9 at 14. The first page of the document separately listed Richard 
Pace, Mary Pace, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis, and included the Pace's and 
Rivers' home addresses. State's Exh. #5 at 1 and Defendant's Exh. #9 at 1. The 
address listed for Judge Davis was the street address for the Fourth Judicial District 
Court building. Id. 
Concerned that a $4,200,000 lien had been filed against him, Judge Davis 
forwarded the Administrative Judgment document to the AOC. Id. at 251; see also id. 
at 256-259. Thereafter, the AOC filed a petition to nullify the lien against Judge 
Davis. Id. at 251-52; see also State's Exh. #13. On 20 May 2005, Third Judicial District 
Court Judge Quinn entered an Order that (1) "[t]he document entitled 
'Administrative Judgment' recorded on November 15,2004 in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder against [Judge] Davis [was] a wrongful lien under Title 38, 
Chapter 9 of the Utah Code"; (2) the "document [was] void ab initio"; (3) Judge 
Quinn's Order "may be recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office, along with a 
legal description of [Judge] Davis' property to have the wrongful lien removed from 
any property owned by [the judge]"; and (4) Judge Davis was entitled to reasonable 
costs and attorney's fees. State's Exh. #13 (a copy is attached in Addendum B). 
While Judge Quinn's civil ruling declared Defendant's lien void as to Judge Davis's 
property, it did not expressly void Defendant's lien on the property owned by the 
Paces or attorney Rivers. R462:254. 
7 
At the criminal trial on the instant charges of filing a wrongful lien, the Paces, 
attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis all testified that they had no contractual 
obligations to Defendant and that they did not otherwise owe him money for which 
he would be entitled to record the lien. See R462:75,106,146-47, 245-46. 
Although neither the Paces nor attorney Rivers had tried to sell their 
respective homes, they were all were concerned that the $4,200,000 lien Defendant 
had recorded against each of them would be an encumbrance to any future attempt 
to sell their homes or other property they may possess. See id. at 81-82,101,104,107-
112, 126, 144-46. For example, Rivers, a real estate attorney, testified that in his 
experience, they would be unable to get title insurance. Id. at 146,149-50. While 
Rivers had been able to obtain a second mortgage on his own home after Defendant 
filed the $4,200,000 lien against him, he explained that the transaction had been 
handled by a mortgage company owned by a neighbor and friend for whom he 
performed legal work. Id. at 152-53, 176. But for his close relationship with the 
mortgage company, Rivers believed that Defendant's $4,200,000 lien would have 
been an encumbrance to obtaining the second mortgage. Id. at 176. 
In January 2005, Detective O'Bryant, an investigator with the Utah County 
Attorney's Office, opened an investigation into Defendant's conduct at the behest of 
the AOC. Id. at 191, 193-94. After Detective O'Bryant contacted Defendant, 
Defendant sent him a letter in which he admitted having the Administrative 
8 
Judgment document recorded. Id. at 196; see also Defendant's Exh. #12. Detective 
O'Bryant also asked Defendant to remove the liens against the Paces, attorney 
Rivers, and Judge Davis, but noted that Defendant had not done so by the time of 
trial. Id. at 197. Finally, Detective O'Bryant investigated whether Kenneth James 
Nielsen had authority to act as an administrative judge in the State of Utah and 
determined that he did not. Id. at 195. 
Defendant, who represented himself at trial, denied that the Administrative 
Judgment document he had recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office 
constituted a lien against property owned by the Paces, attorney Rivers, or Judge 
Davis. Id. at 277-78. Rather, Defendant opined that he recorded the document to 
alert others that he owned the laundromat, and that his only intent in listing the 
addresses of the Paces, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis was "to identify where 
these people were being contacted at. There was no intent to lien or have the 
appearance of a lien/7 Id. at 277. Rather, Defendant opined that if he had intended 
the document to be a lien, he would have used legal descriptions of the Paces', 
attorney Rivers', and Judge Davis' property, rather than their mailing addresses. Id. 
Finally, Defendant opined that he was personally unaware of any encumbrance on 
the Paces', attorney Rivers', or Judge Davis' property. Id. at 279. 
On cross examination, Defendant acknowledged that although he knew that 
other individuals considered the Administrative Judgment document to be a 
9 
wrongful lien, he had taken no action to remove the wrongful lien. Id. at 281. Nor 
did he amend the document to clarify that it was not in fact a lien, even after he 
knew that he was to be criminally charged. Id. at 281-82. Defendant conceded that 
the word lien was used throughout the document, and that "the document refers to 
itself as a commercial lien, and also as a lien hold claim, and it states that it can 
attach to property/7 Id. at 281. Defendant also acknowledged that Kenneth James 
Nielsen was not an authorized administrative judge, and that the Administrative 
Judgment document had not been filed in any recognized court of competent 
jurisdiction. Id. at 284. Finally, Defendant acknowledged that he had known that he 
had a remedy in civil court if he disagreed with the result of the quiet title action. Id. 
at 288. 
At the close of the evidence, the parties discussed the proposed jury 
instructions. Id. at 290-92. The trial court specifically asked if Defendant had any 
objection to proposed jury instructions 28 through 34: " [Defendant], any objections 
to these instructions?"4 Id. at 290. Defendant, who as noted, was acting pro se, 
4
 The first page of Jury Instruction # 34 states that "[t]he document entitled 
'Administrative Judgment7 recorded on November 15,2004 in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder against [Judge] Davis is a wrongful lien under Title 38 Chapter 
[sic] of the Utah Code/7 R268. The second page of the instruction stated: "Judge 
Anthony Quinn, Case No. 040906021 MI, Order dated May 20,2005, Third District 
Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah/7 R269 (a complete copy of the instruction 
is attached in Addendum C). 
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expressly stated that he had no objection: "No, your Honor/' Id. at 291. The trial 
court then asked if Defendant had any objection to additional instructions proposed 
by the State: "Any objections to these?" Id. Defendant again said "No." Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant's challenge to Jury Instruction #34 is precluded by the 
invited error doctrine. The invited error doctrine applies because Defendant 
expressly stated on the record that he had no objection to any of the proposed jury 
instructions. Defendant thus invited any possible error in the instructions and his 
claim should be denied on that ground. 
Point II. Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to find him 
guilty of four separate counts of filing a wrongful lien, because he caused to be 
recorded only one document. Contrary to his assertion, however, Defendant was 
properly convicted of four separate counts. The Administrative Judgment 
document recorded in the county recorder's office purported to encumber property 
of four different owners, each of whom Defendant asserted were liable to him for 
$4,200,000 in damages. Because the focus of the wrongful lien statute is on 
protecting property owners, the statute does not distinguish between recording one 
document that purports to encumber property belonging to four different owners, 
and recording four different documents that each purport to encumber property of a 
different owner. Defendant is just as culpable under the first scenario as he suggests 
11 
a person would be under the second scenario. He thus fails to show any 
insufficiency in the evidence, let alone an insufficiency so obvious and fundamental 
that the trial court plainly erred by submitting four separate counts of filing a 
wrongful lien to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
Although Defendant has retained counsel on appeal, he was a "self-
represented party" at trial. See Allen v. Fuel, 2008 UT 56, ^ 11, 194 P.3d 903. As 
such, he was "entitled to every consideration that may reasonably be indulged." Id. 
(case citation and quotation marks omitted). "However, [a]s a general rule, a party 
who represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice 
as any qualified member of the bar . . . " Id. (case citation and quotation marks 
omitted). Additionally, "'reasonable' indulgence is not unlimited indulgence." Id. 
There is thus no requirement that courts "attempt to redress the ongoing 
consequences of the party's decision to function in a capacity for which he is not 
trained." Id.} see also State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 1f t 19-21, 28, 128 P.3d 1171 
(declining to excuse Winfield from invited error doctrine and preservation rules 
where he acted pro se at trial). 
12 
I. 
DEFENDANTS CHALLENGE TO JURY INSTRUCTION #34 IS 
PRECLUDED BY THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE BECAUSE HE 
AFFIRMED ON THE RECORD THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION 
TO THAT OR ANY OTHER INSTRUCTION 
In Point I of his brief, Defendant asserts that Jury Instruction #34, which 
instructed that the Administrative Judgment document was a wrongful lien, 
violated his state and federal constitutional rights to have a jury determine all the 
elements of the charged offense. Aplt. Br. at 11-12. Defendant acknowledges that he 
failed to preserve this issue below, but asserts that it is nonetheless reviewable 
because the instruction constituted structural error, and because, in any event, it was 
plainly erroneous. Aplt. Br. at 1, 16-25. Defendant, however, not only failed to 
object to Jury Instruction #34, but he also affirmed on the record that he had no 
objection to that or any other instruction. R462:290-291. Accordingly, his claim of 
error —be it structural or plain—is precluded by the doctrine of invited error. 
Utah's "invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error/' Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,117,164 P.3d 366 (quoting State 
v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, | 15,128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)); see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (same). "By 
precluding appellate review, 'the doctrine furthers this principle by "discouraging 
13 
parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden 
ground for reversal on appeal/ , , , , Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 17 (quoting State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,112,86 P.3d 742). A defendant is "'not entitled to both the 
benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal/" Id. (quoting 
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^ 13,131 P.3d 202) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) ("[W]e do not 
appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on appeal under the plain error 
doctrine. . . . [I]f trial counsel's actions amounted to an active, as opposed to a 
passive, waiver of objection, we may decline to consider the claim of plain error"). 
Rather, the invited error doctrine encourages counsel '"to actively participate in all 
proceedings to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence," thereby 
"fortifying] our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first 
opportunity to address a claim of error/" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, % 17 (quoting Winfield, 
2006 UT 4, f^ 15) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, Defendant's statements to the trial court that he had no objection to any 
of the proposed jury instructions, affirmatively invited any possible error therein. 
See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f^f 62-63,114 P.3d 551 (declining to review claimed 
instructional error where Pinder "signal[ed] by an affirmative act that he had no 
objection"). As a consequence of Defendant's express statements below, his claim of 
instructional error on appeal is precluded, whether characterized as structural or 
14 
plain error. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f^f 8-12 (holding invited error doctrine 
precluded court from addressing purported structural error); State v. Hamilton, 2003 
UT 22, *([ 54, 70 P.3d 111 (holding jury instruction may not be assigned as error "if 
counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or 
she had no objection to the jury instruction"); State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, f^ 12, 
136 P.3d 1261 (declining plain error review where counsel stated he had no 
objections to jury instructions); State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, % 7,132 P.3d 703 
(declining to review purported structural error where counsel "affirmatively 
approved the instructions at trial"); State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, ^ 52-55, 989 
P.2d 1091 (declining to review elements instruction that omitted mental state 
element, where counsel invited error); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 
App. 1991) (rejecting purported claim of structural error in reasonable doubt 
instruction where counsel invited error); cf. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 13 (declining to 
review jury selection process for plain error, where Winfield, acting pro se, 
affirmatively approved panel); State v. Person, 2009 UT App 51, f 10, 204 P.3d 880 
(declining plain error review where counsel conceded evidentiary hearing could be 
held in Person's absence). 
15 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
JURY CONVICTION FOR FOUR COUNTS OF FILING A 
WRONGFUL LIEN; HE THUS FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN SUBMITTING FOUR SEPARATE 
COUNTS TO THE JURY 
In Point II of his brief, Defendant asserts that "the evidence was insufficient to 
find [him] guilty of four separate counts of filing a wrongful lien." Aplt. Br. at 25 
(bolding and capitalization omitted). Specifically, Defendant asserts "that [he] 
caused to be filed a single document entitled 'Administrative Judgment/ T h u s , . . . 
he should have been charged with only one count of filing a wrongful lien." Aplt. 
Br. at 25. 
Defendant asserts this issue was preserved at preliminary hearing where 
counsel argued he should be bound over on only one count of filing a wrongful lien, 
as opposed to four counts. Aplt. Br. at 29 (citing R465:27-31).5 Defendant's 
challenge at preliminary hearing was mooted, however, once he was convicted 
beyond a reasonable doubt for four counts of filing a wrongful lien in district court. 
See State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565, 566 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing challenge to 
bindover order is mooted once a defendant is convicted). Defendant did not 
thereafter argue in district court that only one count of filing a wrongful lien should 
5
 While Defendant was represented by retained counsel at preliminary 
hearing, as noted, he proceeded pro se at trial. 
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be submitted to jurors, nor did he ask that his four convictions be merged. 
Consequently, Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
four separate counts of filing a wrongful lien, as opposed to one count, may be 
reviewed only for plain error. See Aplt. Br. at 26 (asserting unpreserved claims may 
be reviewed for plain error). 
'To demonstrate that plain error occurred in the context of a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must show 'first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury.'" State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,1j 32,55 P.3d 1131 
(quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 17,10 P.3d 346). Defendant has not made 
either showing. 
A court will find the evidence insufficient to support a jury verdict only when, 
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted/7 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court will "review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
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favorable to the verdict/7 State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, j^ 15, 63 P.3d 94 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, Defendant acknowledges that he is guilty of filing one wrongful lien, 
disputing only the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for three 
additional counts: "at most, the evidence established only that [Defendant] caused 
to be recorded one wrongful lien that encumbered four different owner's interest in 
a certain real property/7 Aplt. Br. at 28. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
To prove filing a wrongful lien, the prosecution must show, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that a person intentionally or knowingly recorded or caused to be 
recorded, "any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an 
owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed7' the 
document "is not'7 "expressly authorized77 by statute, court order or judgment, or 
the owner of the real property. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-94(6) (West 2004); see also 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-5(2) (West 2004) ("A person who intentionally records or 
files a causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien with the county recorder is 
guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time of recording or filing, the person 
knowingly had no present lawful property interest in the real property and no 
reasonable basis to believe he had a present, lawful property interest in the real 
property77). 
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Defendant does not dispute that the State established any of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to Richard Pace, Mary Pace, or 
attorney Rivers. Indeed, he does not dispute that (1) he caused the Administrative 
Judgment document or lien to be recorded; (2) he had no present, lawful interest in 
Richard Pace's, Mary Pace's, or attorney Rivers' real property and no reasonable 
basis for believing he did; and (3) the document encumbered Richard Pace's, Mary 
Pace's, and attorney Rivers' real property. See Aplt. Br. at 27-30.6 
With one exception, Defendant also does not dispute that the State established 
any of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to Judge 
Davis. Defendant disputes that the Administrative Judgment document constituted 
a wrongful lien against Judge Davis, because he did not list the judge's residential 
address in the document. See Aplt. Br. at 26-28. However, Jury Instruction #34 
instructed that the Administrative Judgment document was a wrongful lien against 
Judge Davis. See R268-69. Because Defendant expressly stated that he had no 
objection to the instruction, the doctrine of invited error precludes his challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence in this regard, just as it precludes his challenge to the 
instruction itself. See Point I, above. 
6
 While Richard and Mary Pace did not own separate property, they were 
served separate copies of the Administrative Judgment document. See R462:106 
(affirming "separate copies [were] sent to [Richard] and one sent to Mary"). 
19 
As noted, the thrust of Defendant's sufficiency challenge is that because he 
filed only one document, albeit one that "encumbered four different owner's interest 
in certain real property," he is guilty, at most, of only one count of filing a wrongful 
lien. Aplt. Br. at 28. As support, Defendant purports to quote the "plain language" 
of the wrongful lien statute: LD" 
[Defendant] asserts that the plain language of the statute shows that a 
person is "guilty of a single third degree felony" if he "records or files . 
. . a wrongful lien . . . if" he has no lawful interest in the property. See 
U.C.A. § 38-9-5(2). 
Aplt. Br. at 30 (emphasis in original). Based on the quoted language, Defendant 
asserts that "because he filed only one document, he should have faced only one 
count of filing a wrongful lien." Aplt. Br. at 30. 
Defendant misquotes the wrongful lien statute. The second highlighted 
word - "single" - appears nowhere in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-5(2) (West 2004): 
A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third 
degree felony if, at the time of recording or filing, the person 
knowingly had no present, lawful property interest in the real property 
and no reasonable basis to believe he had a present, lawful property 
interest in the real property.7 
Thus, contrary to Defendant's assertion, the plain language of the wrongful lien 
statute does not limit the State to filing a "single" wrongful lien charge per recorded 
7
 Although Section 38-9-5 has since been repealed, see Laws 2005, c. 93 § 12, it 
was in effect in November 2004, when the Administrative Judgment document was 
recorded. 
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document. Indeed, this case illustrates why Defendant's construction is 
nonsensical. 
The Administrative Judgment document Defendant caused to be recorded 
here purports to encumber the real property of four different owners, each of whom 
was served with a separate copy of the lien. Thus, the real property of all four 
owners named in the lien was encumbered the same as if Defendant had filed four 
separate liens. Yet under Defendant's reading of the statute, the State could 
prosecute on behalf of only one of the four affected property owners. But the 
wrongful lien statute does not distinguish between recording one document that 
purports to encumber property belonging to several different owners, and recording 
several documents that purport to encumber property belonging to different 
owners. Rather, the focus of the wrongful lien statute is on protecting affected 
property owners: 
A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third 
degree felony if, at the time of recording or filing, the person knowingly 
had no present, lawful property interest in the real property and no reasonable 
basis to believe he had a present, lawful property interest in the real property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-5(2) (emphasis added). 
Given the statute's focus on protecting property owners, a plain reading 
authorizes the State to prosecute on behalf of all affected owners, whether identified 
in a single recorded document as here, or in separately recorded documents. The 
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State's construction makes sense because Defendant is just as guilty of purporting to 
encumber the real property of four different owners under the first scenario as he 
suggests he would be under the second scenario. See Aplt. Br. at 30 ("If [Defendant] 
had filed four documents, then he would have been subject to four charges"). 
Accordingly, Defendant's jury convictions for filing wrongful liens against Richard 
Pace, Mary Pace, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis should be affirmed. 
In sum, Defendant has not shown, and cannot show, that the trial court 
committed plain error in submitting four counts of filing a wrongful lien to the jury. 
Certainly, Defendant has not shown any insufficiency in the evidence, let alone an 
obvious and fundamental insufficiency in the evidence. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, \ 
32 (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17).8 
In a document entitled "Verified Objection and Supplement to Brief of 
Appellant Filed by Counsel for Appellant," which Defendant filed pro se, and 
which defense counsel adopted via letter, Defendant suggests that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that the Administrative Judgment document was a wrongful 
lien or that any owner's property was actually encumbered. Defendant's claim is 
inadequately briefed. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ^ 15,72 P.3d 138 (refusing 
to consider inadequately brief argument). Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, requires an appellant to include his "contentions and reasons . . . with 
respect to the issues presented," including "citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." Utah courts have consistently held that issues not 
properly briefed should not be addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 
960, 966 (Utah 1989). "'A reviewing court is entitled to have the issue clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited/" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah 
App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 20 April 2010. 
M A R K L . SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
A^istant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
Defendant's spare reference to the record does not comply with rule 24(e). 
Moreover, his insufficiency claim is unsupported by citation to pertinent statutes 
and case authority; thus, Defendant's claim is necessarily devoid of meaningful 
analysis. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App. 1992). 
This Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research/" State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f^ 31, 973 P.2d 404 
(quoting Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450)). Accordingly, Defendant's insufficiency claim 
should be rejected. See id. (refusing to consider claim due to lack of meaningful 
analysis); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim where brief "wholly 
lack[ed] legal analysis and authority"). 
In any event, "when a court with proper jurisdiction enters a final judgment,. 
.. that judgment can only be attacked on direct appeal." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22, % 25, 70 P.3d 111. Defendant did not directly appeal Judge Quinn's ruling that 
the Administrative Judgment document constituted a wrongful lien as to Judge 
Davis, nor did he file a motion to have it set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. "Because [Defendant] failed to use any of the available 
legal avenues for challenging" Judge Quinn's ruling, "he has waived any right to 
argue that [it] was invalid." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 31. While Judge Quinn's ruling 
did not expressly rule that the Administrative Judgment document constituted a 
wrongful lien as to either of the Paces or attorney Rivers, the evidence sufficed to 
show that the document "purported] to create a lien or encumbrance" on their 
property. See section 38-9-1(6). Indeed, Defendant admitted that the term "lien" 
appears throughout the document and that it also "states that it can attach to 
property." R462:281. 
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Recording Requested by: 
Jerry C. Cooper, Record Owner 
£11 I ' ^°™T UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
245 Astro Drive
 E0M Nov 15 3:48 pi FEE 78.00 BY LJ 
Kelso , Washington [98626] RECORDED FOR COOPER, RICHARD 
Utah county 
The State of Utah 
The united States of America, anno Domini 1791 
ADM IN IS TRA TIVE 
JUDGMENT 
Claim AJ-2 7-21-98 
[RE: Identified as Amended Complaint, 27 Dec, AD 2002, Civil No. 020408808: Parties] 
[PACE v COOPER: Court, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH] 
Jerry C. Cooper 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington 
For Himself and Two Private Entities: 
COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST 
aka, "CFT MANAGEMENT", and "CFT", 
CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP 
aka, "COG" 
Aggrieved Party/Creditor 
against 
RICHARD W. PACE, 1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
MARY J. PACE, 1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
RODNEY W. RIVERS, 497 North 800 East 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Juije, % 125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Aggressor(s)/Respondent(s)/Debtor{s) 
VERIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
Verified Declaration 
County of Waffcfoftj* >
 s s 
* e State of Ufak ! * • * * - " « * 
D e c l a r a n t s t a t e s t h a t he i s competent t o be a w i t n e s s , 
t h a t t h e f a c t s c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n a r e t r u e , c o r r e c t and comple te , 
and no t m i s l e a d i n g , t o t h e b e s t of Dec la ran t*s f i r s t hand knowledge 
amd b e l i e f under t h e p e n a l t y of pe r ju ry pu r suan t t o t h e Law of The 
S t a t e of lAi6k\ • 
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I , your D e c l a r a n t , do t e s t i f y t h a t I have had i n my p o s s e s s i o n 
e a c h o f t h e o r i g i n a l documents i d e n t i f i e d a s Tracking Numbers 7 - 2 1 -
98-D1 AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, and Tracking No. 7 ~ 2 i - 9 8 ~ E l 
NOTICE OF FAULT, and T r a c k i n g No. 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 - F 1 D e c l a r a t i o n and- N o t i c e , 
o f DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, and I have examined them and i t i s 
my f i n d i n g t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s , pages and c o n t e n t s are each 
a t r u e and c o r r e c t p r e s e n t m e n t a s found i n t h e o r i g i n a l i n s t r u m e n t s . 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SHOWS THE FOLLOWING: 
T h i s Matter i s In t h e Nature o f an Independent P r i v a t e 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a t u r a l Law A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Remedy w h e r e i n : 
EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW IS PARAMOUNT AND MANDATORY UNDER LAW. 
The Following Def in i t ions of Terms Apply Herein 
"NOTICE" means in any form, actual communicated knowledge of any f a c t , intended t o 
appraise a person of ma t t e r s ' i n which his in te res t are involved, which 
would put an ord inar i ly prudent person on inquiry from a proper source, when 
the sought to be affected by the not ice knows thereby, giving duty to the 
Party notified to take act ion, as may be jus t i f ied• 
"commercial paper" means instruments used in the broadest sense of the terra such 
as offers, c r a f t s , complaints, summons, warrants, etc.. which may involve 
accommodation p a r t i e s or s u r e t i e s , including any type of business or a c t i v i t y 
which i s carried on for a p r o f i t , gain, enrichment or s a t i s f a c t i o n , or bene f i t . 
"Stewardship" and "Trusteeship"* means an appointee f s du t ies who oversees the ca r ry -
ing out of. the w i l l of the organization pursuant t o and i n conformity with i t s 
authorizing indenture with consideration and meeting of minds under contract• 
"Jury 'Trial" means as an "Amendment VII" t r i a l by 12 jurors and does not mean an 
"advisory ;;ury" wherein the jury lacks verdict power t o bind the court* 
"Tax Deed" means instrument #81081, dated 15 Hay, 1997, Utah County Recorder, Utah. 
"Fault" means "biegligence; and e r ro r or defect of judgment or of conduct; and 
deviation from prudence, duty or rec t i tude ; any shortcoming or neglect of 
care or performance r e s u l t i n g from inat tent ion, incapacity or pe rve r s i ty ; 
a wrong tendency, course, or ac t ; bad fai th or mismanagement; neglect of duty* 
The word connotes an ac t t o which blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming 
or culpabili ty a t t a ches . " 
"Bad Faith, , means "the opposite of good f a i t h , generally implying or involving 
actual or- constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or 
a neglect or refusal t o f u l f i l l some duty of come con t rac tua l ob l iga t ion
 i not 
prompted by an honest mistake as to one's r igh t s or d u t i e s , but r a the r implies 
-the conscious doing or a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral a f f i r -
matively operating with f u r t i v e design or i l l w i l l . " 
"Default" means "3y i t s de r iva t ion , a f a i l u r e , an ommision of t h a t which ought t o 
be done. Specif ical ly , the omission or fa i lure to perform a l ega l or 
contractual duty, t o observe a promise or discharge an ob l iga t i on ; or t o 
perform an agreement." 
"Co-extensive business agreement*1 means an agreement in equity brought about a f t e r 
receipt of a Notice of Fault wherein there i s a f a i lu re xo respond, and such 
is o&emed as an acceptance of the facts as the s t i pu l a t i ons t h e r e t o , and that^ 
i s -the co-extensive business agreement entered i n t o , which i s .enforced i n equi ty . 
"Commercial Grace" means "72 hours of time" to be absolutely sure as t o the c&use 
of lack of response t o a presentment, to affirm i f for reason of overs ight , 
neglect, or i na t t en t ion t o no t i ce , or to determine i f the non-response was 
in fact in ten t iona l , malicious, and done with in ten t t o do commercial harm. 
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The Following Definitions of Terms toolv Berein 
- a i r f i e l d Trust Doctrine" ia stare decis is and imposes f ? 8 ^ * c 2 £ £ c £ r -
descend to leve l of a mere private corporation andtake ° n ^ S ^ r 
i s t i c s of a mere private citizen...Where private ^ r a t * f ^ ^ ^ £ 
S d securities isconcerned. . .unless i t i s the Bolder inDue ****>£ 
some contract or commercial agreement between i t " ^ - T L S S e n t , 
demands for performance are made, and i s willing to produce said aocurn^ , 
and to place toe same into evidence before trying to enforce * * » £ " , n 
"Natural Law' means "The law of nature dictated by God ^ ^ ^ S n £ a r y 
ESunHies and at a l l times; no human laws are ^ • ^ ^ f l S i d l their 
to this: and such of them as are valid oerive a l l force and a l l tneir 
Stnort ty from this origin." <31ackstone's Commentaries of 1 * ^ ™ 
••ACCOMMODATlS PART?" means one who signs c o m m e r c x * J ^ £ £ & £ * £ & t o 
for the purpose of lending his name, to give credit, to anoJier p ^ 
instrument(s) signed? ~ cp«irina t o 
-SURETY" means one at toe request of ^ ^ ' ^ ^ S ^ l f J ^ S S of 
him a benefit, becomes responsible for the £ * * » » ^ ^ o D A T I O N PARTY. 
some act in favor of a third party; herein ^ ^ J f * J * T ^ a l i s pendens 
•Cp-ercia l Lien" means in the nature of a < * ? T * £ ^ W * £ S does not 
l i e n , i s not a statutory l i en , and i s not a ^ ^ i ^ ^ T ^ e c u t i o n . 
require a court process for i t s establishment, val idity or « « = » 
"Right of Lien" means a right to enforce a charge ^ ^ ° ? f ^ ° L l S t e s h i l a r s . 
payment or sat isfact ion of a debt that i s « « ? f * * ^ t £ J 5 a S i Lien. 
"Lien Bold Claim" means a one hundred one year ^ ^ J ^ ^ t ^ ^ p r i n c i p l e s 
••Peace and Dicnitv" oeans the ^ f j ^ T z g S t o m S l n c , which God 
cinoing in a l l countries, auuhciea o y w = « < > ^T . , ,,„.; _*,.,.«... 
i s referred to as the "Almighty tod", the giver of -11 .a*nt t . 
"TACIT PROCURATION" means by operation of law, one person's s i l e n c e gives pow 
of attorney in fac t t o another person as proxy to act for the sclent pers 
by the s i l en t person's authority. nsrt ies whose 
T>.» ftrooess of Law" means: "Minimal F « * f * ^ * ? , ^ ^ • i n ^ r d e T t h t t they 
rignts are to be affected are entitled to be heard and an %^ ^ ^ ^
 7 9 . 
« f W * that r ight , they must be n o t i f i * ' \ * £ ~ * ~ L ^ t S'bad f a i t h . 
"Condition of Commercial Fault" means Fault by negligence and F a ^ t Dy cm 
«Dollarsn7:rS*nBian71tai:S^tates Dollars
 s^  
"Aggrieved Tartv" means a Party entitled to resort to a remedy. 
Notioe of "nft Entry of DEFAULT 
T - s i-s a Notice of Default upon two instruments t i t l e d AFFIDAVIT OF ^ I C E 
AND D E ^ T r a c k i n g No. 7-21-98-D1, with three At t a l e n t s « « J * £ ^ ^ t l 
Record in 3 parts and the Administrative Judgment #2 i s * * * * * * ^ d l £ r T C E OF 
No. 020408808, and #3 i s a copy of ORDER dated 7 January AD 2004 ^ w e l c T 
FAULT, Timely Private Notice of Condition of Commercial ^ £ t f r F a ^ u r e to^ 
Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Tracking No. ^ f i g ' ^ J ° S the 
proof of service Exhibits 1 . 2. 3. and 4 . , as presented to toe' ^ j ? * 1 3 ^ 0 ^ 
%* day of r^^r . AD 2004, and on _ £ * . day of Or^tC. • m ZUU*' 
respectively. 
By the terms and conditions and pursuant to the provisions contained ****& 
DEMAND; as to what would be acceptable as performance, RESPONDENTS' non^answer i s 
a posit ive act of performance under the terms and therefore created a " - ^ 3 
contract wherein each RESPONDENT i s under obligation individually t0 .^mfJLJ*LQi„ 
S good faith answer, object, rebut, refute, and/or otherwise respond. Accordingly 
each RESPONDENTS' fa i lure to respond places each RESPONDENT individually at 
DEFAULT, and DEFAULT i s hereby Entered. 
- 3 -
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By said DEFAULT, each RESPONDENT, individually, is deemed to be in BAD FAITH 
and NEGLIGENT in failing to respond and adjudicate any problems between CREDITOR 
and RESPONDENTS. As a direct and approximate result of this default RESPONDENT!S), 
severally and jointly, are estopped from bringing any act or actions against the 
CREDITOR as to the following factual ISSUES, listed in said FAULT as Items 1, 2 & 3. 
1. Jerry C. Cooper is a Beneficiary to the Original organic law Jurisdiction. 
2. Paragraphs "IV." and "V." of "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW," of ADMINISTRATIVE JUDCMENT 
#AJ 7-21-98, are valid, in force and binding. 
3. Each Verified ISSUE of Fact for Establishment of CLAIMS and OBLIGATIONS, 
ISSUE #1 through and including ISSUE #72 is deemed as admitted 
undisputed Fact by TACIT PROCURATION, Stare Decisis.* 
Notice of and Entry of DISHONOR 
Each RESPONDENT'S-;failure to respond to the NOTICE OF FAULT within three 
days after receipt, resulted in a DEFAULT thereto, being issued with DISHONOR 
Entered. A DISHONOR constitutes a stipulation to, and an admission of, the 
facts contained in the "Notice of Each RESPONDENT'S Stipulations/Admissions 
pursuant to Notice of Fault", which lists Items l.# 2. and 3. above. The 
principle, "Notice to agent is notice to principal, and Notice to Principal is 
notice to all agents," applies herein. 
Notice of and Entry of DECISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SHOKS THE FOLLOWING: 
F I N D I N G S O F F A C T 
A. On the ^^L day of <^fc»j>gr , AD 2004, Jerry C. Cooper, hereinafter 
"Creditor", did cause service upon RICHARD VJ. PACE, MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. 
RIVERS, AND LYNN K. DAVIS, hereinafter "DebtorCs}", individually, with a 
true and correct copy of an instrument titled AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, 
Tracking No. 7-21-9B-D1, hereinafter ".DEMAND*, • with three Attachments. 
B. That examination of Creditor's private files and records in this cause shows 
that each RESPONDENT was -served by private or U.S. Mail service a true and 
correct copy of DEMAND on the "yfe day of Sy^e^vt>er . AD 2004, a copy of 
proof of service is attached hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
C. That more than twenty-one calendar days, as were provided, have elapsed 
since the day each RESPONDENT was served with a copy of DEMAND, excluding 
the date thereof, and no RESPONDENT has made a response to current date. 
D. On the j2>S day of Qchktr ,AD 2004, Creditor did cause service upon each 
RESPONDENT, individually, with a true and correct copy of an instrument titled 
NOTICE OF FAULT, Timely Private Notice of Condition of Commercial Fault for 
Failure to Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND
 f Tracking No. 7-21-98-E1, 
with four proof of service Exhibits 1., 2.,:-3.j-and 4. 
E. That examination of Creditor's private files and records in this cause shows 
that each RESPONDENT was served by private or U.S. Mail service a true and 
correct copy of NOTICE OF FAULT on the /2& day of Qchkcr AD 2004, a 
copy of proof of service is attached hereto as Exhibits 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
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F- That three (3) calendar days, as an additional 72 hours of commercial grace, 
after receipt of said NOTICE OF FAULT, as was provided, have elapsed since 
the day each RESPONDENT was served with a copy of NOTICE OF FAULT, excluding 
the day of service, and no RESPONDENT has made a response within three (3) 
days, and has made no response to current date* 
G. Each RESPONDENT herein has failed to answer all said instruments and otherwise 
did not meet the requirements of the instruments and that the requirements 
for entry of Default, Dishonor, and Decision by Creditor are met. 
H. On or about the 2 6 ^ day of Octrees' AD 2004, Creditor did enter upon 
the Administrative Record a DEFAULT, DISHONOR, and DECISION and each RESPOND-
ENT was served a true and correct copy of same as a 90 day Statement billing* 
A copy of proof of service is attached hereto as Exhibits 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
C O N C L U S I O N S O F L A W 
Foundational Preface from "OONCUJSICRS OF LAW", ADMINISTRATTVE JUDGMENT AJ 7-21-98 
Effective: 14 September, AD 1998, nunc pro tunc 
"IV. RICHARD W. PACE and MARY J. PACE have abandon all legal claims as may be, 
applied against the COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a trust, 
Washington county, State of Utah, and their SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may 
be, to the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah: 
COM 415.10 FT 3 OF NE COR, BLK 8, PLAT C, FROVO CTTY SURVEY: 
E 66.84 FT; S £9.30 FT; K 66.84 FT; N 89.30 FT TO BEG. 
AREA .14 OF AN ACRE. 
"V. RICHARD W. PACE and/or MARY S'. PACE, their successors and assigns as may be, 
may not argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the administrative findings 
entered, as based upon PACE'S Default to CFT's administrative process, nor 
in any subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding, wherein the COOPER 
FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a trust, Washington, county, State of Utah, 
and their SUCCESSORS and-ASSIGNS as may be, has the right to take the 
subject matter to any court that they may choose,11 
NOTE; Two case numbers have appeared on the pleadings, as No. 020405508 and 020408808, 
#1 RESPONDENT Lynn W. Davis works at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
and is employed as a district court officer, judge. This RESPONDENT is 
named in his individual private capacity. 
#2 RESPONDENT Rodney W. Rivers lives at 497 North 800 East, Lindon, Utah 84042, 
and is employed by R. Pace and M. Pace RESPONDENTS, as a Court officer attorney 
at law. This RESPONDENT is nalned in his individual private capacity. 
#3 RESPONDENTS Richard W. Pace and Mary J. Pace, individually, live at 1350 
East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003, and each is a complainant. Each 
RESPONDENT is named in his and her individual private capacity. 
rA It is deemed a concluded fact that Richard W. Pace, Mary J. Pace, Rodney W. 
Rivers, and Lynn W. Davis are each an ACCOMMODATION PARTY for RICHARD W* PACE, 
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MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, ,and LYNN W. DAVIS, respectively, by their acts 
and actions of individually signing commercial paper for the purpose of lending 
his/her name, to give credit, to another party to instrument(s) signed, and 
at the request of another, and for the purpose of securing to him/her a benefit, 
each is a SURETY, respectively, and become responsible for the performance 
by the latter. 
#5 RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, and LYNN W. DAVIS, are jointly 
and severally RESPONDENT parties to this DEMAND, hereinafter "RESPONDENT(S)w. 
#6 On or about 11 December, AD 2002, R. Pace and M. Pace, contracted with R. Rivers 
to represent their private interest; and thereafter R. Rivers contracted with^ 
the public Court to have L. Davis, 3udge, to provide both plaintiff and defend-
ants due process of law judicial process in Civil No. 020408808, as a condition 
of contract, prior to entering the jurisdiction of the court, or judgment. 
#7 R. Pace and M. Pace amended their complaint on 27 Dec€*mber, AD 2002, which 
centered on a Tax Deed purchased by R. Pace and M. Pacs on 15 May, AD 1997, 
to land owned by CFT earlier to which R. Pace and M.Pace did claim a 63% 
interest and sought in case No. 020408808: 
1. Partition to sell Tax Deed pior^rty and divide proceeds, 63%, 37%. 
2. By conversion/exclusion lost income of $50,000, May 1997 to Jan. 2003. 
3. Quiet title to secure 63% interest in property. 
4. For wrongful lien by successor owners of $10,000.00• 
#8 CREDITOR commenced to timely answer the Pace complaint by bringing before the 
Court substantive rights issues, with the primary controversy being the Court's 
bar against the CREDITOR'S free exercise of secured and protected Natural Law 
(international) constitutional rights and substantive civil rights to defend 
and protect land and property under his stewardship contracts and as need to 
speak for CFT, COS and JERRY 20, and not to be impaired in doing so. 
#9 CREDITOR further demanded on and before, and after, 23 May, AD 2003, by a 
Petition in writing for a Trial by Jury, the fee having been satisfied, to 
obtain a court of justice trial by jury and not an advisory "type" jury. 
#10 On 23 May, AD 2003, CREDITOR gave personal NOTICE to each RESPONDENT with a 
CAVEAT concerning his authorization to appear under contract obligations for 
any and all entities under his charge as a private contract right; and claimed 
all rights, privileges and immunities as secured and protected, giving express 
and implied NOTICE* as to invasion of said rights under Webster Bivens, 403 US 
388, inter alia, and 42 USC 1986, 1985 and 1983, if RESPONDENTS should so do* 
#11 On or aboux 12 June, AD 2003, R. Pace, M. Pace and R. Rivers sought for an 
ORDER froa L. Davis, judge, as follows: 
1. To Disqualify CREDITOR from acting as legal counsel for COS and CFT. 
2. To strike all pleadings/documents by CREDITOR for CFT and COG. 
3. JERRY 20, CFT, and COG have twenty (20) days to hire a legal counsel. 
#12 On or about 12 June, AD 2003, L. Davis, judge, ordered R, Rivers to prepare 
an Order barring CREDITOR from appearing for JERRY 20, CFT and COG. 
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#13 On and before, and after, CREDITOR demanded that L. Davis, judge, to show his 
authorization of law on the record which would support his ORDER barring 
CREDITOR to defend under his stewardship contract(s) in CFT, COG or others. 
#14 At no time did any RESPONDENT reveal to CREDITOR any authority to support the 
ORDER to disbar or disqualify the CREDITOR from defending under his contracts. 
#15 On or about 12 December, AD 2003, RESPONDENT R. Rivers alleged in his proposed^ 
order that CREDITOR was "not licensed to practice law in the state (for emphasis 
see #16) of Utah from representing the Cooper Family Christian Equity Trust, 
the Celestial Organization Group, and the Jerry 20 Charitable Trust," 
#16 It is deemed a concluded fact that it was RESPONDENTS', R. Rivers and L. Davis, 
claim, by the use and acceptance of the lower case "s" in the term "state of 
Utah", that it was "their" intent that the republic Utah, 1B96, and the 
Republic United States of America, 1789, did not secure and protect the 
CREDITOR'S private (international) Natural Law constitutional rights, 
privileges and immunities on and before 7 January, AD 2004. 
#17 On 7 Januaryy AD 2004, RESPONDENT L. Davis, accepted the proposed Order of 
12 December, AD 2003, and did strike all of the CREDITOR'S pleadings and 
answers for CFT and COG and jury trial, which created a default by the striking 
of the answers and pleadings of CFT and 003 to the PACE Complaint, and then order-
ed the land and property to be sold giving M. Pace and R* Pace, S3% of the sale 
price, plus $50,000.00 in lost income and $10,000*00 for wrongful lien claim. 
#18 It is a fact that the Bill of Rights, 1791, did Amend the Constitution of 
the United States, 1789, which made clear that men's rights, privileges and 
immunities which were secured and protected thereby, were those in existence 
prior to 1789, and were prohibited from being impaired by the legislative 
venue/jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation], including all future 
State legislative venue/jurisdictions, including the STATE OF UTAH [Incorpor-
ation], 7 January, AD 2004. 
#19 On or about 7 January, AD 2004, by the concerted actions of all RESPONDENTS 
an ORDER was fashioned and executed under color of State statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage. See Attachment #3 herewith as a true copy* 
#20 Each RESPONDENT on or about 20 January, AD 2003, received actual NOTICE of a 
true and correct copy of Offer, Fault and Default, parts of Attachment #1 
of the Administrative Record without the Administrative Judgment. 
#21 No RESPONDENT has given NOTICE to the CREDITOR of what statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, was used to support the ORDER of 7 January, AD 
2004, which in force and effect compelled CREDITOR'S performance to hire an 
attorney, Mr. Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684), to retrieve the lost land and 
property of COG, CFT, and JERRY 20, as may bet 
#22 RESPONDENTS R. Pace and H. Pace, have claimed since 15 Hay, AD 1997, the date 
Paces bought the Tax Deed to the CFT property, up to 12 December, AD 2003, 
that Paces had a right and have been prohibited or restricted from using or 
benefiting from their 63% interest right in the Tax Deed property. 
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#23 That examination of CFT's private files and all records available to. the 
Creditor shows that there has been no contact or conmunication from any Pace or 
Pace representative, from 15 May, AD 1997,'through to 11 December, AD 2002, 
evidencing a claim, demand or a request of any kind seeking to have access t.6* 
or use of, or to seek a benefit from, in regard to Pace's Tax Deed claim* 
#24 That examination of CFT's private files and all records available to the 
CREDITOR shows that there is no contract or communication from any Pace, or 
Pace representative, from 15 May, AD 1997 through to 11 December, AD 2002, 
evidencing a claim or demand for compensation in lieu of use of Tax Deed land. 
#25 That examination of the exclusive administrative record (available for judicial 
review), as Attachment #1 , shows that RESPONDENTS R. Pace and M. Pace have 
been fully, lawfully ana equitably, compensated or satisfied for whatever 
interest that may have been due them as to the Pace Tax Deed investment. 
#26 On or about 23 May, AD 2003, all RESPONDENTS were given NOTICE that CREDITOR'S 
responsibilities under stewardship contract obligations as Trustee/Director 
are of a protecting nature and none of the activities performed by the Trustee/ 
Director can be construed as the "practice of law" by the Creditor, as the office 
of "protector" is a custom and a private (international) Natural Law right 
long enjoyed and secured for trustees of private trusts from time immorial. 
#27 As a direct result of RESPONDENTS • concerted actions to seek and obtain the 
ORDER of 7 January, AD 2004, did cause injury by impairment of CREDITOR'S 
rights in contracts and others under color of State law and the CREDITOR was 
compelled to make a considerable outlay of private funds to hire Mr. Vincent 
C. Rampton (USB 2684), attorney, to stop the injury and to try to make good 
the wrong done by the RESPONDENTS, jointly and severally. 
#28 On 7 January,. AD 2004fc. RESPONDENT L. Davis, judge, did execute an ORDER and 
Court did execute the proposed "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and 
Order of Judgment" bearing a mailing date of 12 December, AD 2003. 
#29 The Parties 
a. Is being brought by Jerry C. Cooper, Record CWner, Notice of Interest 
Creditor, herein nCREDITOR/Creditoru, for himself, and as Successor Trustee 
for private COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, ska CFT MANAGEMENT, aka 
CFT, and as Director for private CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP, aka COG, 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington [near 98526] 
b. [A Real Party of Interest, Noticee] 
[STATE OF UTAH (Incorporation), Officers, agents, successors, counsels, etc.3 
[Governor, UTAH STATE CAPITOL 3UILDING, % UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL] 
[UTAH STATE CAPITOL BUILDING] 
[Salt Lake City, Utah] 
c. Is being brought against Notice of Interest Respondents, herein »'RESPONDENTS/ 
Debtors11, jointly and severally [In Fraud under Color of Law/Office], 
RICHARD W. PACE 
MARY J. PACE 
1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
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RODNEY W. RIVERS, Attorney at Law 
497 North 800 East 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
Honorable LYNN W. DAVIS, District Court Judge 
% 125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
This is NOTICE OF REJECTION OP OPFE& TO CDNERACT by Special Appearance. 
This matter is In the nature of an Independent Private International 
Natural Law Administrative Remedy. 
On or about 12 June, AD 2003, in Utah, and in consideration of the foregoing 
ISSUES of Fact, #1 through #30, RESPONDENTS,R. Pace, M. Pace, and R. Rivers 
sought for an ORDER from the 'Court which was granted on or about 12 December, 
AD 2003, by RESPONDENT L. Davis, judge, which ORDER was under color of Utah 
statutes, ordinance, regulation, custoro, or usage, subjected CREDITOR as a 
person within the jurisdiction of the United States of America to the 
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutions 
and laws of Utah and the United States of America, which did interfere with 
the CREDITORS Natural Law constitutional rights and civil rights by 
impairment under color of State law, which ORDER in force and effect did 
strike all pleadings, all defenses, and other documents filed in the Court 
by the CREDITOR,, for and in the capacity of a commissioned and authorized 
Director and Trustee under a private stewardship contract to protect all 
Land and property of the private Celestial Organization Group, and private 
JERRY 20 Charitable Trust, and the private Cooper Family Christian Equity 
Trust, each created under private (international) Natural Law, secured and 
protected under the Bill of Rights, 1791, Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, 1789, [Republic](without the legislative venue/jurisdiction 
of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation]), and the ORDER did strike the contract 
with the Court for a Trial bv Jurv court of justice, the fee having been 
satisfied for Civil No. 020408808, the .said act did not preserve to the 
CREDITOR his stewardship contract under provisioo's aorcrerrfci of Art. I, S&z. 
10, CI* L13, "No State shall.*. pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts,.•.", aad Amendment [V, 1791], ''No person shall bs. • .deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;.*.", Constitution of 
the United States, 1789, [Republic](without the legislative venue/jurisdiction 
of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation]); it has been deemed that violating, 
depriving, trespassing on, or interfering with, secured constitutional 
rights, privileges, or immunities, is an offense so serious that it is 
beyond satisfaction , merely obtained by payment of money damages, thus 
RESPOmEKTS ought to be put in jail, and as rights were demanded PRIOR to 
deprevation, jail time ought to be doubled (as it is for road construction 
after given a slowdown warning), but in consideration of Title 28 USC 1331(a), 
the claim in a "rights" action must "exceed the sum of value of $50,000.00, 
exclusive of interest and costs", and the CREDITOR is entitled to and hereby 
claims injuries resulting in damages as just compensation in the amount of 
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($100,000.00), jointly and severally, 
from each RESPONDENT. [ [Cf. 42 DSC 1983 aod Bivens v. 6 Agents (1971}] 
:
 nCf.u means compare for contrastedr analogous, or explanatory view. 
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. [Note: Conclusions of Law #32 through and including #72 have not been reproduced 
herein but by reference are made a part hereof in full hereinat as found 
in the Declaration and Notice of DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, Tracking 
No. 7-21-98-FI. However,. #3i has been set out in full above to show format 
example used in each of the other forty-one (41) individual and separate 
Conclusions of Law, each different and distinct. Verified or plain true 
copies may be obtained from the Record Owner for a reasonable fee. Each 
RESPONDSNT/Debtor was given individual notice on or about 23 May, AD 2003, 
that Creditor was an aggrieved party who had demanded all of his secured 
rights and gave CAVEAT that remedy or relief in the nature of Title 42 
United States Code 1983, 1985, or 1986 may be sought as well as Bivens vs. 
Six Agents, 403 US 388, 29 LEd2d 619, 915 S.Ct 1999, may be considered if 
secured rights are invaded, deprived or otherwise impaired*] 
D E C I S I O N 
Accordingly, 
I* IT IS THE DECISION t>ased upon the factual and legal determina-
tions of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that 
Richard W. Pace, Mary J. Pace, Rodney W. Rivers, and Lynn W. 
Davis, are each an ACCOMMODATION PARTY and SURETY bound with 
RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, and LYNN W. 
DAVIS, respectfully, as Debtors, severally and jointly, for the 
payment or satisfaction of all liability, debt or obligations 
incurred in NOTICE and DEMAND, Tracking No* 7-21-98-D1, and 
other charges or fees which may be incurred in any collection 
actions through PESPONDENTS/Debtors' failure to honor said 
liability, debt-or obligations. 
II. IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based' upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact, A. through and includ-
ing H.f and Conclusions of Law, #1 through and including #72, 
that each ISSUE does address the acts, duties or relationship of 
RESPONDENT as public persons, who have each acted in some 
capacity as agents, for themselves or others, which acts have 
been deemed prejudicial to Creditor*s secured Constitutional 
rights, privileges or liberty interests. 
Ill* IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that ISSUES #1 through and including #30 must be construed as 
part of each ISSUE, #31 through and including #72; in that context 
it has been deemed that each ISSUE, #31 through and including 
#72, constitutes a separate and distinct act wherein Creditor's 
secured Natural Law rights, privileges, or immunities and/or 
Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities, have been by 
each RESPONDENT, jointly and severally, impaired or deprived 
under color of the Utah law by conspiracy did cause injury and 
damaged to the Creditor, as defined by each ISSUE independently. 
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IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
it has been deemed that damages as just compensation in the 
sum of value of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars 
(5100,000.00) for each ISSUE, #31 through and including #71, 
is an equitable amount and is the decision. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
it has been deemed as to ISSUE #31 through and including #72, 
that the following amount in sum value of FOUR MILLION TWO 
HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($4,200,000.00), const-
itutes the total Debt due and owing, by each RESPONDENT as 
Debtor, severally and jointly, with no interest thereon, to the 
Creditor, Jerry C. Cooper, his heirs, representatives, or 
assigns, as may be. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that upon service of a true and correct copy of the instrument 
identified as DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, upon each RESPOND^ 
ENT/Debtor, does constitute a Statement and Demand for payment 
or satisfaction in full, of the Debt sum due is FOUR MILLION 
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($4,200,000.00), 
with no interest thereon. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that the said Statement and Demand for payment is a "true bill 
in commerce" wherein each RESPONDENT/Debtor-, 'severally and 
jointly, have ninety (90) days after service of same in which 
to pay or satisfy the Debt or obligation to the Creditor, or 
his agent, Wayne Rulan Sevan, agent, ^3865 No. Quail Summit 
Lane, Provo, Utah [84604], and thereafter said "account receiv-
able" becomes a "commercial lien" and can attach to property* 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based on the governing law of a 
"true bill in commerce" that anytime after ninety (90) days, 
after receipt of Statement, that if there is an unpaid or 
unsatisfied Debt balance due to the Creditor, the Creditor, or 
his heirs or assigns, as may be, has a Right of Lien to execute 
a Lien Hold Claim in the amount of the unpaid or unsatisfied 
Debt obligation, as may be, against any and all property of 
each RESPONDENT/Debtor1s property, and all that which may be 
distressed/arrested/impounded/use-suspended as may be in third 
party custody, until the 1st day of January, AD 2105, defined 
as a Lien Hold Claim, as a term of one hundred one years. 
["The ability to place a lien upon a man's property such as 
to temporarily deprive him of its beneficial use, without any 
judicial determination of probable cause dates back not only 
to medieval England but also to Roman times." Cf. Sniadach v. 
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Family Finance Corp.# 395 US 337, 349 (1968), supported by 
the California Supreme Court, 1971, Randone v. Appellate Dept. 
S C3d 536, 96 Cal Eptr 709, and 44B P2d _, 3 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that Creditor's Right of Lien is in the nature of a commercial 
lien and is not a lis pendens lien, is not a statutory lien, 
and is not a common law lien, and does not require a court 
process for its establishment, validity, or execution and it 
cannot be removed by summary process (judge's discretion), nor 
by anyone except the authorized person, who alone holds the 
Right of Lien to the Lien Hold Claim(s), as may be* 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that said AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND constitutes a TRUE 
BILL IN COMMERCE established by Creditor's Statement under 
affidavit, certified and sworn as to ledgering, or accounting, 
with every entry, by number, verified and sworn as true, correct 
and complete, and not misleading, in good faith and not in bad 
faith, under penalty of perjury, which has been further assented 
to by each RESPONDENT/Debtor. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION that the authorized person having 
the Right of Lien, to the Lien Hold Claim(s), may open by 
administrative procedure for further remedy or relief until the 
attainment of the ends of justice have been satisfied anytime 
prior to the 1st day of January, AD 2105, 
Further Declarant says not« 
Given under my har*d and seal this the 
1 ^ day of /V*t/&y»\*>t?-AD 2004, 
Cprint] K^ rt * &tk~ &* MA^^ Vinson 
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Claim AJ-2 7-21-98 
I , t h e H e a r i n g O f f i c e r , d e c l a r e t h a t I am l e a r n e d i n t h e Law and 
have k n o w l e d g e of t h e p r i n c i p l e s and p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d f o r 
t h e e x h a u s t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s and I am c o m p e t e n t 
t o make an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n * 
I , t h e H e a r i n g O f f i c e r , a c t i n g i n t h e c a p a c i t y of an A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
R e v i e w e r , h a v e d e t e r m i n e d from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d t h a t 
t h e c o r r e c t p r o c e s s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W* P a c e , Mary J - P a c e , 
Rodney W. R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
" F o u n d a t i o n a l P r e f a c e from "CONCLUSIONS OP LAW", ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDGMENT, AJ 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 , E f f e c t i v e : 14 S e p t e m b e r , AD 1 9 9 8 , n u n c 
p r o t u n c " a s a d m i t t e d u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, 
S t a r e D e c i s i s , a s f o l l o w s : 
"IV. RICHARD W, PACE and MARY J . PACE have abandon a l l l ega l claims as may be , 
applied aga ins t the COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a t r u s t , 
Washington county, State of Utah, and t h e i r SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may 
be, to the following described t r ac t of land in Utah County, State of Utah: 
COM 415.10 FT E OP HE COR, BLK 5, PLAT C, PROVO CITY SURVEY: 
E 66.84 FT; S 89.30 FT; W 66.84 FT; K 89.30 FT TO BEG. 
AREA .14 OF AN ACRE. 
"V. RICHARD W. PACE and/or MARY J . PACE, the i r successors and assigns as may be, 
may not argue, controvert , or otherwise p ro tes t the adminis t ra t ive f indings 
entered, as based upon ?bCZ*$ Default t o CFT's adminis t ra t ive process , nor 
in any subsequent administrative or jud ic ia l proceeding, wherein t he COOPER 
FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a t r u s t , Washington, county, Sta te of Utah, 
and t h e i r SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may be, has the r i g h t t o take t h e 
subject matter to any court tha t they may choose." 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , 
Rodney W* R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
FINDINGS OF FACT, A. t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g H . , a s a d m i t t e d 
u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s -
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Kary J . P a c e , 
Rodney W. R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, I s s u e #1 t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g I s s u e # 7 2 , 
as a d m i t t e d u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t DECISION h a s b e e n 
e n t e r e d a g a i n s t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , Rodney W. R i v e r s , 
and Lynn W. D a v i s , and i n f a v o r of J e r r y C. C o o p e r , f o r h i m s e l f , 
and a s S u c c e s s o r T r u s t e e f o r p r i v a t e COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN 
EQUITY TRUST, aka CFT MANAGEMENT, aka CFT, and a s D i r e c t o r f o r 
p r i v a t e CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP, aka COG. 
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As an operation of Law, administrative admitted facts are not 
subject to reconsideration in any action in Law, Commerce, or 
otherwise. 
JUDGMENT IS SO ENTERED. 
Given under my hand and seal this the 
JJL day of flJoL>e#lhi?f . AD 2004. 
icer 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me, p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me 
kW\n-e4r\ 3 a M € S \)c\ )$0r\ . and upon p r o p e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , d i d 
e x e c u t e t h e f o r e g o i n g ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT on t h i s P d a y o f 
A/ jP l rg^Wc , AD 2 0 0 4 . 
CN^JtL^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
L 4 ^ S e a l 
BECKV HANSEN 
mtMPUBUC* STATE OftMtf 
tC25 WEST RED OJFFS DRfVS 
WASKJNGTOH, tfTAH 84780 
CQMM. EXPIRES 4-2^2008 
P repared and s u b m i t t e d on t h i s Y day of / k W ^ p g k AD 2004. 
.ry C. Cooper, Creditor 
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Addendum B 
Brent M. Johnson (5495) 
Attorney for Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
P.O. Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 
Tel: (801) 578-3800 
-*•..,, FILED 
*"
U
'
LA
«£ DEPART. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS, in his 
official capacity as judge of the 
Fourth District Court, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JERRY C. COOPER, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case No. 050906021 MI 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
This matter having come on for hearing on May 10, 2005 at 8:30 a.m. The Petitioner 
appeared through counsel Brent M. Johnson of the Administrative Office of the Courts. The 
Respondent Jerry Cooper failed to appear. The court reviewed the arguments of the parties and has 
made findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The document entitled "Administrative Judgment" recorded on November 15,2004 
in the office of the Utah County Recorder against Lynn W. Davis is a wrongful lien under Title 38, 
Chapter 9 of the Utah Code. 
2. The document is void ab initio. 
3. This order may be recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office, along with a legal 
description of Lynn W. Davis' property to have the wrongful lien removed from any property owned 
by Lynn W. Davis. 
4. Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-9-7(5)(c) and the schedule in Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The award is as 
follows: Attorney's fees $150.00 and service fees $45.00, for a total of $195.00. 
DATED this 2 & day of May, 2005. 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed first class, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows on this_ / ^ d a y of May, 2005. 
Jerry C. Cooper 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington 98626 
sJiloaK^ 
Diana Pollock 
Addendum C 
INSTRUCTION NO 34 
The document entitled "Adminstrative Judgment" recorded on November 15, 
2004 in the office of the Utah County Recorder against Lynn W. Davis is a wrongful lien 
under Title 38 Chapter of the Utah Code. 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
Case No. 040906021 MI 
Order dated May 20,2005 
Third District Court 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
